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THE PERSISTENCE OF RESISTANCE: CIVIC
RIGHTS, NATURAL RIGHTS, AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER
"THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS"
David Thomas Konig*
Whenever we talk of "the people," we would do well to consult
Mark Twain, whose jaundiced views of "the people" were balanced by
an equally hopeful appeal to our better efforts. Twain's first venture
into reporting and the writing of fiction (a distinction he often
blurred) took place in Nevada, where he worked as a newspaper
reporter, covering, as all cub reporters must, the crime beat. A
decade later he drew on those experiences in Roughing It.l Murder by
gunfire-often upon the slightest provocation-amazed the young
transplant, despite his upbringing in Missouri, which had its own
bloody legacy. What startled Twain most, however, was the routine
acquittal of the defendant "desperadoes" by jury verdict. "Not less
than a hundred men have been murdered in Nevada-perhaps I
would be within bounds if I said three hundred-and as far as I can
learn," he confessed, "only two persons have suffered the death
penalty there."2
The source of the problem was trial by jury-"the very palladium of
free government" according to Alexander Hamilton3 and to
generations that followed. "Trial by jury is the palladium of our
liberties," Twain concurred.' "I do not know what a palladium is,
having never seen a palladium, but it is a good thing no doubt at any
rate."5 He acknowledged that the trial by jury once had had its
justifications. "It is a shame that we must continue to use a worthless
system because it was good a thousand years ago," he admitted.6
Caring neither for the kind of originalism that lurked behind the
* Professor of History in the College of Arts and Sciences and Professor of Law in the
School of Law, Washington University in St. Louis.
1. Mark Twain, Roughing It (University Press 1996) (1872).
2. Id. at 351.
3. The Federalist No. 83, at 562 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
4. Twain, supra note 1, at 351.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 343.
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veneration of the ancient constitution (nor, for that matter, historical
accuracy), he explained:
Alfred the Great, when he invented trial by jury, and knew that he
had admirably framed it to secure justice in his age of the world, was
not aware that in the nineteenth century the condition of things
would be so entirely changed that unless he rose from the grave and
altered the jury plan to meet the emergency, it would prove the most
ingenious and infallible agency for defeating justice that human
wisdom could contrive. For how could he imagine that we
simpletons would go on using his jury plan after circumstances had
stripped it of its usefulness, any more than he could imagine that we
would go on using his candle-clock after we had invented
chronometers?7
Twain was describing a process that we would do well to consult in
our efforts to understand how the eighteenth-century "right of the
people to keep and bear Arms"8 has undergone a transformation
similarly destructive of its original understanding and object. I refer -
as did Twain-to popular understandings of constitutionalism, ideas at
odds not only with the historical record but with law as interpreted in
our courts. Whatever their vague understanding in the mining camps
of Nevada, both jury participation and the keeping and bearing of
arms had once been conceived as "civic rights" within an eighteenth-
century conception of rights. Such civic rights, as Cornell and DeDino
demonstrate, were "the rights and obligations associated with a
citizen's duty to society: participation in government as a political
official, participation in the legal process as a juror, participation in
the electoral process as a voter, and participation in the militia."9
Like Twain, Cornell and DeDino remind us of the vast gap between
judicial and popular constitutionalism. Prof. Cornell has written
about "plebeian" populist constitutionalism as a "dissenting tradition"
in American law in The Other Founders."0 In that important book he
examined the many competing traditions in the American Founding
and provided a constitutional dimension to the persistence of a pre-
modern agrarian tradition" in the form of nineteenth-century grass-
roots insurgency." This conflict reflected another persistent clash
over legal institutions in Anglo-American legal history-what Peter
7. Id. at 341.
8. U.S. Const. amend. II.
9. Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487,508 (2004).
10. Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting
Tradition in America, 1788-1828, at 107-20 (1999).
11. See David Thomas Konig, Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts: Essex
County, 1629-1692 (1979).
12. See Alan Taylor, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary
Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760-1820 (1990); see also Charles W. McCurdy,
The Anti-Rent Era in New York Law And Politics (2001).
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Karsten has called the contest between "'high' and 'low' legal
cultures"13 in a legal tradition where the common law acknowledges
organic growth, local imperatives, and the force of localism. Much of
that contest derives from the uneasy tension between "periphery" and
"center," of course, and the uncompleted project of extending a
unified and coherent constitutional regime among a westering
people. 4 But what Cornell and DeDino examine, and what I wish to
expand upon here, is not a question of the federal relationship, though
it does involve a heavy localist component. Rather, I wish to examine
the persistence of an extralegal insurgent tradition that is deeply
rooted historically, and thus all the more intractable as a problem in
the rule of law in our culture. "Violence has been used repeatedly in
our past, often quite purposefully," writes Richard Hofstadter, "and a
full reckoning with the fact is a necessary ingredient in any realistic
national self-image."15 We ignore this lay populist tradition at our
peril, for to do so is to fail to recognize-and acknowledge-its reality
and thus its impact on present debates. It will not go away, because its
pedigree as history-even if not as law-is all too genuine.
How a constitutional right conceived within "the powerful legal
discourse of civic obligation"" can be claimed by many today as an
entirely different sort of personal right is a challenge to the historian,
and it is to that confusion that I wish to turn. At its core, this problem
touches how people regard rights. Cornell and DeDino discuss the
"civic right" of bearing arms-one that locates the bearing of arms
within a tradition of citizen obligation to the community. It was not a
purely "individual" right in the sense of a personal right removed
from civic obligation. As I have examined it elsewhere in the British
and American tradition, it stood with the right to serve as a juror in
pronouncing communal judgment and imposing the force of the
community on those who violated its legally established norms, or-in
the case of bearing arms-against those who threatened its safety. It
was, that is, an individual right exercised collectively.17
13. Peter Karsten, Between Law and Custom: "High" and "Low" Legal Cultures
in the Lands of the British Diaspora-The United States, Australia, and New
Zealand, 1600-1900 (2002).
14. This is most notably expressed for early American constitutional development
by John Phillip Reid in a multivolume series abridged as John Philip Reid,
Constitutional History of the American Revolution (1995) and by Jack P. Greene,
Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the
British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (1986).
15. American Violence: A Documentary History 475 (Richard Hofstadter &
Michael Wallace eds., 1970).
16. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 9, at 491-92.
17. David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing Transatlantic
Context for the Historical Meaning of 'the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms,'




The desperadoes and sympathetic jurors of Twain's Nevada
reflected a frontier ethos, to be sure, but not one confined to the
distant reaches of new settlements where established institutions did
not reach. It had deep historic roots in the legacy of Anglo-American
society, where there existed a dissenting tradition that never fully
accepted orthodox law and legal institutions. Cornell's plebeian
constitutionalists drew on this long tradition and bequeathed it to the
nineteenth century, where it was exaggerated by a fervent cult of
honor and justified by an egalitarianism that made firearms an agent
of equality-altogether producing what Richard Slotkin has called
"the Cult of the Colt.""8  Private or extralegal communal violence
gained legitimacy in such a culture, where both jury service and the
bearing of arms were divorced from their civic (that is, legally and
politically sanctioned) exercise, and the impulses behind them
returned to their pre-political natural state. Thomas J. Kernan, a
Louisiana attorney, criticized this private usurpation of a community's
legal procedures in 1906 when he lamented-but accepted as reality-
what he called a "jurisprudence of lawlessness."' 9 According to its
rules, for example:
Any man who commits rape upon a woman of chaste character shall,
without trial or hearing of any kind, be instantly put to death by his
captors or other body of respectable citizens not less than three in
number; and they shall have the right to determine the mode of
execution, which may be both cruel and unusual, the Constitution
and laws of the state and of the United States to the contrary
notwithstanding."z
Kernan's activist lay jurisprudents were transforming both the jury
and the right to bear arms from civic rights exercised within
established legal institutions into the natural rights of self-defense and
justice by the aggrieved, exercised either individually or in a group, to
protect the norms of the community.
Their vigilantism sprang from the same "low" legal culture that
motivated many of Cornell's plebeian constitutionalists and pitted
them against a more formal legal culture they distrusted. This culture
clash was not new, nor has it vanished. Michael Dorf recognizes it in
his contribution to this Symposium, and correctly contrasts a
preference for nonjudicial action by those favoring an individual right
to firearms possession with the gun control camp that looks to the
courts.' This conflict over law goes deep, historically, and it is this
18. Richard Slotkin, Equalizers: The Cult of the Colt in American Culture, in
Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America 54-67 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003).
19. Thomas J. Kernan, The Jurisprudence of Lawlessness, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 450, 451
(1906).
20. Id.
21. Michael C. Dorf, Identity Politics and the Second Amendment, 73 Fordham L.
Rev 549 (2004).
[Vol. 73
THE PERSISTENCE OF RESISTANCE
resistance to law and legal institutions that drives many pro-gun
advocates who "claim to be[] victimized by what they and their
sympathizers regard as an elitist liberal establishment." 22 Dorf could
very well be describing the plebeians of which Cornell wrote.
Such anger and resentment at elites tapped deep springs of
resentment, as well as a nostalgic evocation of simpler social
arrangements, uncomplicated by law and legal arrangements
governing what they saw as the source of their liberty and survival-
their property. Central to these fears was the precarious nature of
their land claims. As Alan Taylor has amply demonstrated, squatter
claimants in colonial Maine appealed to a Lockean principle of
property rights based on occupancy and labor.23 Proprietors, on the
other hand, saw property as legal matter, based on documents.24 The
naming of "Freetown, Maine," therefore, was not only a tribute to
freedom, but, Taylor writes, it also "announced the settlers'
determination to pay no outside proprietor for their lands."25  If
challenged as to whether they had properly and legally purchased
their land, squatters might reply, as did one group, "no, hang the
proprietors. They said they were nothing but rogues and they would
cut [timber] where they pleased."26 Legal action was seen as an attack
not only on their property as land, but on all forms of the property
they saw as essential to their freedom. If challenged by the legal
instruments of the state, a land claimant might claim that the political
contract had been broken. "When Property is made uncertain and
precarious," asserted a Lockean land rioter in New Jersey in 1747,
"this band [of government] is broken."27  In such a case, armed
resistance was justified-indeed, obligatory.
"Property" meant more than land and the tangible items people
owned. In the eighteenth century it embodied all that gave one the
capacity for autonomy and survival -"whatever gave a person
independence," writes Gordon Wood, whether that be tools or land.28
It might also be embodied in the weapons used to repel legal
challenges to the land, an act seen as a matter of survival-a matter,
that is, of the most elemental natural right of self-preservation.
Indeed, arms need not be guns. Itinerant minister Samuel Ely rallied
22. Id. at 568.
23. Taylor, supra note 12, at 25.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 128.
26. Id. at 25.
27. Edward Countryman, 'Out of the Bounds of the Law': Northern Land Rioters
in the Eighteenth Century, in The American Revolution: Explorations in the History
of American Radicalism 48 (Alfred F. Young ed., 1976).
28. Gordon S. Wood provides a concise description of this concept in his Preface
to Liberty, Property, and the Foundations Of the American Constitution ix-xiv (Ellen
Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989).
2004]
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the men of western Massachusetts to protect their property against
merchants about to sue and oust them in 1782 with the cry: "Come
on, my brave boys, we'll go to the woodpile and get clubs enough and
knock their grey wigs off and send them out of the world in an
instant. '2 9 How else, asked a farmer there, could they "crush or at
least put a proper check or restraint on that order of gentlemen
denominated lawyers"?3"
But guns served as the best of all tools to fight off the law. In
today's world, argues Richard Slotkin, a firearm is no longer "merely
a tool," but historically many have rejected that distinction. "A gun is
just a tool, Marion," explains the hero of the movie Shane. "Like an
axe or a plow. It's as good or as bad as the man that uses it."'31 A
Maine land rioter, invited to take part in an impending action against
proprietors, was asked "if I had my Gun ready," because firearms
offered many advantages to him and the men who would resist outside
challengers. Direct confrontation, of course, always remained an
option, but pitched battles were to be avoided. Rather, firearms
allowed those resisting the law to hide along roadsides and intimidate
process servers or land agents on their way to oust squatters. Guns
fired near a house at night served the same purpose, as did random
shots fired at homes. These tactics are important, I think, because as
Taylor makes clear, they constituted the extralegal action of a
dispossessed group resisting what it viewed as a threat to its survival.
Their firearms were not only a means of protecting their property,
however; they were a form of property themselves, as necessary as a
plow or a roof over their heads. The tenacity with which gun rights
advocates defend their "right" to keep and bear arms, therefore, is a
product of this basic claim to the natural right of self-defense and
survival. A proprietor's spy among defiant Maine squatters described
their claim to be:
[T]he sole owners of such lands as they have made themselves the
possessors of, and... they have a good right to hold their
possessions by the firelock and will kill any person who offers to run
a compass thro' their possession. This they say is no Murder! This
is the education which they have received from the practice and
parental instruction which they have received .... 11
Pennsylvania squatters were especially receptive to this logic.
Ethan Allen, already famous for his support of land claimants in
Vermont, had visited the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania in the
29. David P. Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion: The Making Of An Agrarian
Insurrection 42-43 (1980).
30. Id.
31. Slotkin, supra note 18, at 58-59. Slotkin continues, "[i]n private hands,
unfettered by regulation, the gun allows an individual to do what in other countries
only the state can legitimately do." Id at 59.
32. Taylor, supra note 12, at 17.
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1770s. Haranguing squatters there with the cry, "[l]iberty &
[p]roperty, or slavery and poverty, are before us," he called on them
to "procure fire-arms, and ammunition, [and] be united among
yourselves."33 It is no coincidence that such rhetoric thrived in that
part of Pennsylvania that produced the famous "Dissent of the
Minority" with its unique claim "[t]hat the people have a right to bear
arms for the defense of themselves and their own state, or the United
States, or for the purpose of killing game."34 It is also no coincidence
that the author of the "Dissent,"35 in his concluding remarks, explicitly
combined support of bearing arms and opposition to a standing army
with protection against court-ordered property seizures supporting
a very expensive and burthensome government. The standing army
must be numerous, and as a further support, it will be the policy of
this government to multiply officers in every department: judges,
collectors, tax gatherers, excisemen, and the whole host of revenue
officers will swarm over the land, devouring the hard earnings of the
industrious .... 36
Squatters saw their rights as given by nature and validated by labor,
and those in Maine disguised themselves as the embodiment of a pre-
political, natural world-as "white Indians"-in their resistance.37
They claimed a pre-political right-a natural right, as it were-that
responded to their rejection of the political contract embodied in law.
So far, such a concept echoes the most proper invocation of Lockean
contract theory. What distinguishes these apostles of natural rights
from the mainstream of the Anglo-American constitutional tradition,
however, and what sets them apart on a dissenting tradition that has
no originalist constitutional credentials, is their failure to complete the
process that Locke and Jefferson saw as necessary. The Declaration
of Independence sets out the stages of revolution as conventionally
understood in the political theory of the Founding Era: once "the
political bands" have been dissolved, a people has the right-and thus
the obligation-"to assume among the powers of the earth the
separate and equal station to which the laws of Nature and of Nature's
God entitle them."38 The people were to reorganize through a new
33. Karsten, supra note 13, at 166; see also id. at 164-76 (providing a highly
insightful discussion of "[t]he [i]nformal [f]aw [o]f [siquatters [a]nd [p]roprietors").
34. 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution:
Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Pennsylvania 623-24 (Merrill Jensen
ed., 1976).
35. 2 Id. at 617.
36. 2 Id. at 639.
37. Taylor, supra note 12, at 181-207. Taylor notes the irony of these claims,
based as they were on dispossessing the very people whose identity they were
claiming. It might be argued, however, that these "white Indians" were basing their
dispossession of Native Americans on a claim of natural law.
38. Thomas Jefferson, The Declaration of Independence as Adopted by Congress,
in 1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 429 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
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political contract, establish political and legal institutions, and to join
the sovereign nations of the world-not revert permanently to a pre-
political status under those natural laws. Jefferson, like Locke, began
with a state of nature; neither ended with one. As Locke explains,
only when "a long train of abuses" by "those in authority" convinces a
majority that such an act is needed would "the dissolution of
government" be justified, whereupon "the people"-an entity he is at
pains to identify as an organized majority- "continue the legislative in
themselves; or erect a new form, or under the old form place it in new
hands, as they think good."39 This distinction is crucial for Locke:
To conclude, The Power that every individual gave the Society, when
he entered into it, can never revert to Individuals again, as long as
the Society lasts, but will always remain in the Community; because
without this, there can be no community, no Common-wealth, which
is contrary to the original Agreement...."
Natural rights might authorize the dissolution and reformulation of
the political community, but they could not serve as an ongoing
structure and could only be exercised within a framework recognized
by law. Jefferson made this distinction when he associated the right to
navigate the Mississippi River as based "on the law of Nature and
Nations"-that is, as recognized in the community of nations and
given force by international law. Such a right, though "written in the
heart of man," was nevertheless "an imperfect right" subject to
negotiation between nations as to how it would actually operate, and
involving "mutual disposition to make equal sacrifices."41
Nevertheless, the power of natural rights, crudely understood in an
age of revolution and egalitarianism, could be an intoxicating brew.
Though Jefferson upheld the use of firearms on one's own "lands or
tenements,"42 he denied it to groups who took arms against duly and
democratically enacted laws with which they disagreed, such as the
embargo. Such assemblages he carefully distinguished as "a number
of individuals." 43
Historians can contribute to the discussion of Second Amendment
rights and to the national debate on gun control if they acknowledge
that the most ardent opponents of firearms regulation, like those
supporting such laws, do have a pedigree reaching back to the
39. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 433 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960) (1690).
40. Id. at 445-46.
41. Thomas Jefferson, Report on Negotiations with Spain (1792), in 1 The Papers
of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 38, at 296, 301-03.
42. Thomas Jefferson, Second Draft of Virginia Constitution (1776), in 1 The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 38, at 353. Locke addressed the issue by
rejecting rules by which "honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates." Locke,
supra note 39, at 434-35.
43. Jefferson to Daniel D. Tompkins, 15 August 1808, in 12 The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson 132 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905).
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Revolution. The founders repudiated an individual right to
unrestricted firearms possession, however, as a dangerously
incomplete "right" which, if allowed to survive, might grow into a
grotesque form of licentiousness that threatened the liberty they were
seeking to preserve. That it survives today despite those vague
constitutional efforts is a testament as much to the distortion of
history as to the distortion of rights theory.
Notes & Observations
